BarChris and the Securities Acts: Practical Responses for Attorneys by Aborn, Richard A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 8
1-1-1969
BarChris and the Securities Acts: Practical
Responses for Attorneys
Richard A. Aborn
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Current Problems Under The Securities Acts is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Aborn, BarChris and the Securities Acts: Practical Responses for Attorneys, 10 B.C.L. Rev.
360 (1969), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol10/iss2/8
"BARCHRIS" AND THE SECURITIES ACTS: PRACTICAL
RESPONSES FOR ATTORNEYS'
The basic purpose of the Federal Securities Acts' is to provide full and
fair disclosure in the sale of securitie&R The philosophy of the Acts was
enunciated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in a message to Congress on
March 29, 1933. He stated that every new issue of securities which would be
sold in interstate commerce must be accompanied by full publicity and in-
formation, and that no important element concerning the issue should be con-
cealed from the buying public. 4
 He viewed the effect of the Securities Act of
1933 as adding "to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let
the seller also beware.' It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the
seller."5
The Securities Acts promote this policy by requiring full disclosure of
pertinent information before trading in a security is allowed to commence.
The instrument of disclosure is the registration statement. The Act of 1933
prohibits an individual from use of the mails or any means of interstate com-
merce to sell a security unless a registration statement is filed as to such
security with the Securities and Exchange Commission.' Furthermore, pur-
suant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, brokers and dealers may not
effect a transaction on a national securities exchange in any security which
has not been registered with such exchange? Although the informational
requirements for a registration statement filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 are not identical
with the informational requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, they are similar. Generally, both types of registration statements must
include information about the issuer such as: its financial condition; the
nature of its business; a list of its officers, directors and holders of more than
10 percent of any equity security of the issuer—including their remuneration
and interests in the issuer's property; stock options existing or to be created;
material contracts; rights and privileges of the various classes of equity secu-
rities; and the names of underwriters' The information which is included in
registration statements must be complete and free of material error, or the
persons who prepared it may incur substantial liability to purchasers of the
security covered by the registration.
1 The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance given to him by the many law
firms which furnished information on the practical responses of the profession to Escott
v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Globus v. Law Research
Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
8 See Securities Act of 1933, preamble, 48 Stat. 74; Knauss, A Reappraisal of the
Role of Disclosure, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 607 (1964).
4 H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
5 Id.
8 Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964).
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)-(b) (1964).
8 Compare Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964), and Securities Act of
1933 Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964), with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 781 (1964).
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The recent decision in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp, has focused at-
tention on the possible civil liabilities resulting from misrepresentations of
material facts'° in registration statements. It is the potential magnitude of
such civil liabilities which has been the cause of great concern. 11 The legal
profession is among the many groups troubled about their possible liabilities
for such material misrepresentations. 12 Attorneys are not primary targets of
the Securities Acts since, in their professional capacity, they are neither issuers
nor "buyers" and "sellers."13 However, the Securities Acts do attempt to regu-
late the conduct of individuals who, while they are not "buyers" or "sellers,"
may become liable because they are peripherally connected with purchases and
sales." An attorney, by virtue of the professional advice which he renders in
the preparation of a registration statement, is such an individual peripherally
connected with purchases and sales. Thus, while an attorney may be liable
under the Securities Acts in some other capacity, for example, as a director
or officer of a corporation, the following discussion will be limited to the pos-
sible liability of an attorney whose sole connection with a security is the render-
ing of professional advice in the preparation of a registration statement. This
comment will examine briefly the statutory bases of attorneys' civil liability
under federal securities laws 15 for material misrepresentations in a registration
statement, and then will focus specifically upon the practical response which
the profession should make in order to minimize financial risk.
I. STATUTORY BASES OF LIABILITY
A. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 16 and
Rule 10b-517
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use of manipulative or
deceptive devices in the purchase or sale of any security. It authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regulations to
enforce this proscription. Rule 10b-5, promulgated in 1942, makes it "unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national security exchange .. No make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
9 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N,Y. 1968).
10 For the purpose of this comment, "misrepresentations of material facts" is in-
tended to encompass actual misrepresentations and, in addition, omissions to state
material facts.
it See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964), where liability
may be as high as the total offering price of the securities to the public.
12 Others include: issuers, underwriters, officers and directors of issuers, accountants
and other "experts" and signers of registration statements. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (:1964).
13 Cf. Knauss, supra note .3, at 608-09.
14 Id. at 609-10.
13 Liability may also be imposed under state law. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18,
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1964). Liability under state law, however, is beyond the scope of this
comment.
10 15 U.S.C. § 785(b) (1964).
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1968).
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ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.. . .""
Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly states that civil
liability will be imposed upon those who violate the Rule, a civil remedy (and
concomitant private action) has been implied by the courts." It is well to
note that a vast number of persons may maintain a cause of action under
Rule l ob-5 since the Rule proscribes a wide variety of conduct and suit has
not been limited to purchasers of a security 2 0
Rule 10b-5 speaks in terms of "any person, directly or indirectly" who
makes a misrepresentation. Since an attorney could be considered to make
a misrepresentation "indirectly" through his participation in the preparation
of a registration statement, it is theoretically possible to maintain a cause of
action against an attorney for such misrepresentation under the Rule.
A cause of action under lOb-5 resembles the common law tort of deceit
in some respects but differs from it in others. 21 As in common law deceit,
there must be proof of reliance upon the misrepresentation before there can
be recovery 22
 It has been suggested that, although pertinent sections of the
Rule fail to mention scienter, a plaintiff would have to establish this element
before recovering. 23
 It seems clear, however, that the common law scienter
requirement of intent to deceive or mislead24 may not be stringently required
in an action under 10b-5.25 Thus, a plaintiff might not be required to prove
that an attorney had an active intent to mislead, merely that the attorney
had been reckless in the preparation of the registration statement.
Finally, the Rule does not require privity,26 as does the common law tort
of deceit, but is dependent upon the defendant's connection with a sale rather
than his status as a "buyer" or "seller." The lack of a privity requirement
further reinforces the theory that an attorney could be liable under the Rule,
since it is obvious that an attorney who helps in the preparation of a regis-
tration statement would not be in privity with a "buyer" or "seller" of the
security. The "no privity" aspect of the Rule, when combined with the notion
that an attorney could be considered to make a misrepresentation "indirectly"
through his work in preparation of a registration statement, leads to the belief
that it is possible to maintain a cause of action against an attorney under
the Rule.
18 Id.
18 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ; 3 L. Loss,
Securities Regulation 1763 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
20 See Comment, The Expanding Uses of Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
313 (1969).
21 For a statement of the elements of the common Iaw tort cause of action in deceit,
sec W. Prosser, Torts 699-700, 713-19 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
22 3 Loss at 1765-66.
23 Id. at 1766.
24 See Prosser at 715.
25 See, e.g., Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties Under Common Law
and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 137, 163-64 (1967), where
it is suggested that reckless and even negligent conduct may be proscribed.
26 See generally 3 Loss at 1767-71.
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B. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 27
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of securities to engage directly or indirectly in any practice which
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser. The language of section
17(a) is virtually identical with Rule 1013-5 except that section 17(a) is worded
to prohibit fraud only in connection with the sale of securities, while Rule
10b-5 merely widened the prohibition to include fraud in connection with
either the sale or purchase of securities. 28 This limitation under section 17(a)
is unimportant here because attorneys who participate in the preparation of
registration statements can only perpetrate a fraud in the sale, not purchase,
of a security. 29 Consequently, since the prohibitions relating to fraud in the
sale of a security are virtually identical under section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5,
the above analysis relating to the possible liability of an attorney under Rule
I0b-5 for a material misrepresentation in a registration statement is equally
applicable to the issue of liability for such misrepresentation under section
17(a).
C. Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343°
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act imposes liability upon any person who
makes, or causes to be made, a material misrepresentation in any document
filed under the Securities Exchange Act. 34 Furthermore, as with Rule 10b-5,
an action under section 18(a) is not restricted to purchasers of a security;
sellers may also sue. It appears theoretically possible to maintain a cause of
action against an attorney under section 18(a), since he could conceivably
"cause to be made" a material misrepresentation by his participation in the
preparation of a registration statement.
As with the common law tort of deceit, a plaintiff suing under section
18(a) must show reliance on the misrepresentation. 32 Furthermore, a plain-
tiff must show causation between the misrepresentation and his harm, since
recovery runs only to those who buy or sell the security at a price which is
affected by the misrepresentation. 33 Finally, it appears that there is no privity
requirement in an action under section 18(a). 34 The lack of a privity require-
ment, plus the notion that an attorney could "cause to be made" a material
misrepresentation, lead to the conclusion that it is possible to maintain an
action against an attorney under section 18.
Section 18 does afford statutory defenses, where a cause of action is
27 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
28 3 Loss at 1426-27.
29 Both of the possible clients, the issuer and the underwriter, prepare the registra-
tion statements for use in subsequent sales of the security to the public.
80 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964..
81 Id. Liability is imposed under section 18(a) only for material misrepresentations
in a registration statement filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.0 §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
32 The 1934 Act itself limits standing under section 18(a) to those "who, in reliance
upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was
affected by such statement. . ." See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964). See also 3 Loss at 1752.
22 3 Loss at 1752.
34 Id.
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established. An attorney would not be held liable if he could prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or
misIeading.33
 Aside from shifting the burden of proof to the defendant at-
torney, this defense is closely akin to scienter, since its effect is to make
actionable solely those misrepresentations which are intentional." An at-
torney would, therefore, be liable under section 18(a) only where he had
knowingly, and with intent to mislead, allowed a material misrepresentation
to be included in a registration statement. Thus, one commentator has stated:
Except for avoiding any question that the person making the
false statement or causing it to be made can be sued by the buyer
or seller nothwithstanding the absence of privity between them, it is
hard to see what advantage § 18 gives the investor that he does not
have in common law deceit . . . s 7
D. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 38
Section 11 of the Securities Act permits the purchaser of a security to
sue specified individuals for damages if there has been a material misrepre-
sentation in any part of the registration statement covering such security. It
has been suggested that the civil liability provisions of section 11 broaden
the common law tort of deceit." This common law tort action was modified
in four respects: the privity, reliance, causation and scienter elements of the
common law tort have been dispensed with in section 11. It is easier, therefore,
to establish liability for material misrepresentations in registration statements
under section 11 than in a common law action for deceit. 4° Furthermore,
it appears easier to establish liability for such a misrepresentation under
section 11 than under Rule 10b-5, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act or
Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, since each of the latter requires
proof of at least one of these elements of the common law tort of deceit.
The traditional requirement of privity between the purchaser of the
securities and the seller has been dispensed with in section 11,41 Any person
who acquired the security issued pursuant to the registration statement may
bring an action against two classes of possible defendants: (1) the issuer, 42
and (2) those persons who were significantly and publicly connected with
the registration statement. 43 This latter class of possible defendants includes
36 Section 18(a) imposes liability "unless the person sued shall prove that he acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 15
U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1964).
30
 3 Loss at 1752.
37 Id.
38 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
89 See Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 819 (3d Cir. 1941).
40 See Note, 44 Notre Dame Law. 122, 124-26 (1968); 3 Loss at 1729-30.
41 See Note, supra note 40, at 125.
42 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a) (1), 15 US.C. § 77k(a) (1) (1964). Section
6(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (a) (1964), requires all issuers to sign the registration
statement.
43 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a) (2)-(5), IS U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2)-(5) (1964).
These include every person who with his consent is named as a present or future director
or partner of the issuer, every underwriter, and experts who with their consent are named
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persons who are not in privity with a purchaser of the security. It should be
noted that an attorney, acting solely in his professional capacity, is not a
member of either class of persons against whom an action may be brought
under section 11. 44
 An attorney could be sued if he were also acting in the
capacity of director or officer of the issuer, but such a suit would be bot-
tomed upon his acting in such other capacity. Therefore, a direct action under
section 11 by a purchaser of a security may not be brought against an attorney
who is acting solely in his professional capacity. However, the principal
clients of attorneys in the preparation of registration statements, issuers and
underwriters, may be directly liable under section 11. As will be discussed in
more detail, an attorney may be indirectly liable under section 11 if he fur-
nishes information to a client which causes the client to be liable. For these
reasons the kinds of misconduct actionable under section 11 are important to
attorneys.
In general, reliance on the misrepresentation need not be proveri. 45 A
plaintiff need only prove that he purchased a security which was issued pur-
suant to a registration statement. Furthermore, a plaintiff need not prove
causation between the material misrepresentation and his damages. Causation,
or more properly the lack of causation, is relegated to the role of a partial
affirmative defense under section 11.46
The plaintiff need not establish scienter in an action under section 11. A
detailed series of provisions which are related to reasonable care have been
substituted for scienter. 47 These provisions do not relate to affirmative proof
by the plaintiff in establishing his case, but rather relate to affirmative defenses
which may be utilized by all defendants except the issuer in an action brought
under section 11. 48
Thus, it is readily apparent that section 11 differs from the common law
tort of deceit in its relaxed rules for establishing a cause of action. It differs also
in its several affirmative defenses. One such defense, relating to reasonable
care, has already been discussed above as a statutory substitute for scienter.
This defense may be termed a "due diligence" defense. Another affirmative
defense, lack of causation, has also already been noted. Closely related to this
latter defense is an exculpatory provision in section 11 which allows any
defendant to escape liability by proving that the plaintiff knew of the material
in the registration statement as having prepared or certified parts of the statement or
reports or valuations used in connection with it.
44 In their professional capacity, lawyers could only be sued under section 11 as
"experts." See note 43 supra. However, "neither the lawyer for the company nor the
lawyer for the underwriters is an expert within the meaning of section 11." Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45 An exception is made for securities purchased after an earnings statement which
covers at least twelve months after the effective date of the registration statement has
been made available. In such cases, recovery "shall be conditioned on proof that such
person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration state-
ment" rather than the earnings statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a) (1964).
46 3 Loss at 1729, referring to Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (e)
(1964).
47 3 Loss at 1724.
48 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1964).
365
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
misrepresentation at the time when he acquired the security. 4° The final
defense available under section 11 is the statute of limitations set forth in
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933. 6° All actions must be brought within
one year after the discovery of the material misrepresentation (or one year
after such discovery should have been made in the exercise of reasonable
diligence) and in no event may an action be brought more than three years
after the security was first offered to the public.
II. SECTION 11 OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND BarChriS 5 '
It appears theoretically possible for an attorney, acting solely in a pro-
fessional capacity, to be held liable for material misrepresentations in an action
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder), Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 or Sec-
tion 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. An attorney may not,
however, be held directly liable in an action under Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933. Yet it is Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 which may
prove most bothersome to attorneys.
The apparent ease with which a plaintiff might establish liability in a
section 11 action against one or more of the specified groups of defendants
led Professor Loss to characterize section 11 as "the bete noir [sic] which
was going to stifle legitimate financing. . . . "52
 The same commentator, how-
ever, lists only eleven reported actions pursuant to section 11 from 1933 to
1961. Only two of these cases were decided in the plaintiff's favor."
Several reasons have been advanced for this scarcity of actions: the care with
which attorneys and accountants prepare registration statements; the close
scrutiny of registration statements by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion; the high cost of litigation; and purchasers' apathy." Nevertheless, Pro-
fessor Loss stated in 1961 that "there are developments—particularly by
way of resort to the 'spurious class action' device—which are giving in-
vestors with a mind to litigate an easier row to hoe." 66
 Since 1961 there
have been at least six actions brought under section 11.66 This apparent
trend toward more litigation under section 11 is the source of much concern
to attorneys.
A more immediate source of concern is the recently decided case of
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corer In this case the BarChris Construction
Corporation filed a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on March 30, 1961 covering a bond offering. An amendment to
the registration statement was filed on May 11, 1961 and a second amendment
46 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964).
5° 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964) .
51 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
62 3 Loss at 1721.
63 Id. at 1687-88 & n.I1. He admits that there must have been many pre-trial settle-
ments during this period, but does not attempt to estimate the number of such settlements.
Id. at 1689.
54 Id. at 1690-92.
55 Id. at 1692.
56 See Note, supra note 40, at 127.
67 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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was filed on May 16, 1961, the effective date of the registration statement.
The net proceeds of the bond offering were received by the BarChris Con-
struction Corporation on May 24, 1961 at the close of the financing. At that
date, BarChris was having some difficulties in collecting amounts due from
its customers. Collection difficulties worsened as time went on and led to a
deterioration of the financial position of BarChris. Finally, on October 29,
1962, BarChris filed a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act.
Nine plaintiffs, who were all purchasers of the bonds, began suit on
October 25, 1962 under section 11. Other purchasers were subsequently al-
lowed to intervene as plaintiffs, and at the time of trial there were over sixty
plaintiffs. The suit was brought against the issuer, signers of the registration
statement, directors of the corporation, underwriters and the auditors who
prepared the financial statements used in the registration statement. It is
noteworthy that although one defendant was an attorney, he was not being
sued in that capacity but in his capacity as a director and signer of the
registration statement."
The court found ten misrepresentations in the registration statement."
Of these, eight were held to be materia1, 60
 because if the information had
been correctly stated or disclosed, it "would have deterred or tended to deter
the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question." 61
The court devoted most of the remainder of its opinion to a consideration of
the "due diligence" defenses which were available to all defendants except the
issuer, BarChris." The court deferred decision on all other affirmative de-
fenses pleaded by the defendants." Since BarChris, as the issuer, did not
have available a defense of "due diligence," it was liable unless it could prove
some other affirmative defense.
The part of the court'3 opinion which deals with the "due diligence"
defense of the underwriters" has particularly important implications for at-
torneys. The court held that the underwriters or their investigating agents
must make some reasonable effort to verify the data submitted to them by the
company and may not rely solely on the company's officers or company
counse1.65 It found further that the underwriters' attorneys who were their
investigating agents did not make a reasonable investigation. Therefore, the
court concluded that because the underwriter delegated to its attorneys, "as
its agent [s] ," the business of examining the corporate minutes and contracts,
the underwriter must bear the consequences of its agents' failure to make an
adequate investigation. 66 The inadequacy of the attorneys' investigation was
based upon several shortcomings: their failure to insist upon the production
of the minutes of the executive committee meetings; their failure to examine
58 Id, at 690.
69 For a summary, see id. at 679-80.
" Id. at 681-82.
01 Id. at 681, quoting Charles A. Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934).
652 See Securities Act of 19.13 § 11(b) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (1964).
" 283 F. Supp. at 704.
64 Id. at 692-97.
05 Id. at 697.
66 Id.
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the financing agreements and correspondence with BarChris' factor; their
failure to examine the contracts which comprised the "backlog" figure; and
their failure to inquire about any new officers' loans."
The implication arising from BarChris is that, if an underwriter is not
able to sustain its "due diligence" defense in an action under section 11 be-
cause it relied upon its attorney as its agent and the attorney was not duly
diligent, then the underwriter is able to sue its attorney in malpractice under
a negligence theory for any damages which it might incur pursuant to a
section 11 liability." Furthermore, there is no reason why the issuer, even
though it is not permitted a "due diligence" defense under section 11, might
not also sue its attorney for malpractice under a negligence theory if the
issuer has been found liable under section 11 because of the negligence of its
attorney. After all, the issuer does rely upon its attorney to select materials
for inclusion in the registration statement, as well as the actual drafting of
the registration statement. Therefore, the significance of BarChris, from the
standpoint of an attorney's liability, is that it implicitly recognizes the mal-
practice action by a client against its attorney in section 11 cases. It is likely
that an increasing awareness of such malpractice action, when combined with
the apparent increase in the number of actions brought under section 11, will
lead to an increasing number of malpractice actions brought by issuers and
underwriters against their attorneys. The problem confronting attorneys is to
determine what practical solutions may be available to avoid this increased
potential liability incurred in the preparation of a registration statement.
III. PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
A. Refusal to Handle Registration Work
It is submitted that registration work should be refused only in specula-
tive circumstances which present no reassuring elements such as representa-
tion by reliable counsel for the other client, the issuer or underwriter. Many
companies have chosen to make public offerings of their securities to acquire
needed capital in preference to making a private offering. Probably this pref-
erence stems from the fact that larger sums of money can be raised in a public
offering and that any interest which might be paid for debt capital is likely to
be lower in a public offering. The increasing preference for public offerings can
be seen partially in the number of filings of registration statements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933:
781 filed in fiscal 1936; 69 449 filed in fiscal 1948; 7° 913 filed in fiscal 1958;"
and 2473 filed in fiscal 1968. 72 In addition to these annual statistics, it is
noteworthy that 840 registration statements were filed for the first quarter of
fiscal 1969, as compared to 507 for a similar period in fiscal 1968. 73
07 Id. at 695-96.
es For a general analysis of the liability of an attorney for malpractice, see Wade,
The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755 (1959) ; Note, Attorney
Malpractice, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1292 (1963).
69 2 SEC Ann. Rep. 31 (1936).
76 14 SEC Ann. Rep. 8 (1948).
71 24 SEC Ann. Rep. 33 (1958).
72 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4934 (Nov. 21, 1968).
73 Id.
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Only under the speculative circumstances described above need registra-
tion work be refused. The work must be performed by someone. Conse-
quently, the satisfaction of a legitimate need of clients requires a solution
which will permit registration work to be done in non-speculative situations
and in speculative situations where reassuring elements are present.
In conjunction with a suggestion that attorneys should refuse to handle
registration work, it could also be suggested that attorneys should limit their
work to providing purely legal services, distinct from the examination of docu-
ments and agreements which do not require special legal knowledge for under-
standing. Such a suggestion could go further, and could have attorneys be
responsible for examination of only those legal matters which other non-legal
personnel, who would perform the basic investigation, might bring to them.
This suggestion lacks merit because the ultimate criterion of whether a
piece of information must be disclosed in a registration statement is whether
that information is "material." A determination of "materiality" is a legal
question to be answered by attorneys. Furthermore, a determination of ma-
teriality cannot be made on the basis of an incomplete understanding of the
issuer's situation. Information which may not in itself be material may be-
come material when it is seen in light of all the facts. It would be nearly
impossible for an individual without expertise in the area to select the in-
formation to give to an attorney. Therefore, the attorney cannot make judge-
ments on materiality solely on the basis of information given to him, but, on
the contrary, must make an independent investigation,'"
13. Obtaining Indemnification Agreement
An indemnification agreement is one by which a party agrees to secure
or hold harmless some other party against loss or damage of a specified
character." Actually there is only one situation where an indemnification
agreement covering an attorney's liability to his client for malpractice might
practically be sought: the attorney for the underwriter might seek one from
the issuer. If one begins with the premise that the issuer needs a public offer-
ing to raise money, then the underwriter and its attorney should be able to
compel the issuer to grant an indemnification agreement to the underwriter's
attorney. Furthermore, it is the issuer who must ultimately supply almost all
information which is in the registration statement and it is the issuer who is
most familiar with his total situation and, therefore, is in the best position to
inform counsel of the relative importance of individual facts. For these
reasons, the issuer should not object as much as the underwriter if counsel
for the underwriter demands protection from liability for misrepresentations.
Although it is conceptually possible for the issuer's attorney to obtain
an indemnification agreement from the underwriter, once it is assumed that
the issuer needs a public offering, it remains difficult to see how the issuer
and its attorney would be able to exert enough pressure to compel the under-
writer to grant such an indemnification agreement. Also, since the issuer's
counsel plays a more important role in the determination of information to be
74 It was precisely this mistake which was made by the underwriter's attorney in
BarChris. See 283 F. Supp. at 697.
75 See Keesler v. Peekskill, I Misc. 2d 744, 746, 152 N.Y.S.2d 919, 922 (1955).
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released, issuer's counsel is at a further disadvantage when he seeks to obtain
indemnification from the underwriter. The underwriter can argue, with some
justification, that it will in no way be responsible for most misrepresentations
and should not indemnify a more culpable participant.
Even if an indemnification agreement can be obtained, it may not be
enforceable. Any analysis of the enforceability of indemnification agreements
between an attorney and either the issuer or underwriter must examine the
importance which courts have given to the notion of public policy in their
examination of agreements which generally relieved against the financial
consequences of civil liability. In the leading case of Railroad Co. v. Lock-
wood," the Supreme Court invalidated a contract exempting the railroad
from liability to a passenger for injuries arising from negligence of the rail-
road. Two reasons were given for the decision: first, relief from liability would
contradict the very purpose of liability in promoting carefulness; 77 and second,
the passenger, because he was in an inferior bargaining position, would be
unfairly deprived of compensation for his injury. 18 Clearly, the first reason
for the decision is applicable to indemnification agreements, since agreements
which release attorneys from liability encourage them to be less careful. Part
of the second reason for the decision in Lockwood may also exist—inferior
bargaining position. However, indemnification agreements differ from the
exculpatory agreement considered in Lockwood. Where there is an indemnifi-
cation agreement, the injured parties, the purchaser of the securities and the
attorney's client, will still be compensated. Thus, where indemnification
agreements have subsequently been challenged under the Lockwood doctrine,
the courts have generally refused to invalidate them, apparently because they
were not inconsistent with the compensation policy fostered by the Lockwood
decision.79 Thus, in cases of strict liability or liability for negligence, where
compensation of the injured party would effectively undo the harm caused
by the conduct, fostering the deterrent effect of liability was considered too
unimportant by itself to be determinative. Therefore, courts held that indemni-
fication by a third party would not offend public policy." Where, however,
upholding the agreement would violate some explicit public policy, then,
regardless of the compensation factor, such an agreement should be invali-
dated.si
One writer has applied the above reasoning to indemnification agreements
obtained by underwriters from an issuer to cover section 11 liabilities." The
conclusion was reached that since the avowed policy of Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and, consequently, the reason for the imposition of
liability, was the encouragement of investigation and disclosure, the section
was intended to have an in terrorem effect. It was felt that if this policy were
76 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
77 Id. at 377-78.
78 Id. at 379-80.
79 Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 72 Yale L,J. 406, 409 (1962).
89 Id.
81 Cf. Akin v. Business Title Corp., — Cal. 2d —, — P.2d —, 70 Cal. Rptr.
287 (1968).
82 See Note, supra note 79.
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to be sustained, courts should not enforce indemnification agreements ob-
tained by an underwriter from an issuer.83
In an analysis of the enforceability of an indemnification agreement ob-
tained by an attorney from either the issuer or underwriter, it is well to
recall that the basis of the attorney's liability is not section 11 but rather his
common law duty to exercise reasonable care, It could be argued, therefore,
that the policy of section 11 should be irrelevant. However, it is submitted
that the policy of section 11 is still relevant. Since it is the attorney who actu-
ally prepares the registration statement in his capacity as an agent for his
client, and since it is the attorney who does much of the investigating, it
appears that if the overriding section 11 policy of disclosure and investigation,
a prophylactic policy, is to have any in terrorem effect in prevention of mis-
representation, the same underlying policy must be applied to the work per-
formed by the attorney. Thus, an indemnification agreement obtained by an
attorney from either an issuer or underwriter is unlikely to be enforceable.
No court has yet considered the validity of indemnification agreements
between an attorney and an issuer or an attorney and an underwriter. It is
possible that courts will ascribe more importance to the remedial purpose of
section 1I and less to its prophylactic functions. If courts do adopt this em-
phasis, it would appear that, since indemnification agreements obtained by
attorneys cover liabilities similar to those in indemnification agreements
already upheld by the courts, the attorney's indemnification agreements
would likewise be enforceable. It is doubtful, though, that the courts will mini-
mize the prophylactic function of section 11.
Even if the courts do place more importance upon the remedial purpose
of section 11 and less upon the prophylactic purpose, a constant danger remains,
as is suggested by the case of Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc." In that case,
the court did not allow an underwriter to enforce an agreement against an
issuer "at least under circumstances where he has been found guilty of mis-
conduct evincing actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity. . . ." 88
If an attorney were to rely only upon an indemnification agreement, he might
find that he had no protection at all since a jury might find that he was not
merely negligent, but was either reckless or even conscious of the falsity.
Moreover, a finding of recklessness is not unlikely where a jury is asked to
consider and judge activity in highly complex and sophisticated transactions
with which they are unfamiliar. A relatively harmless error in an unfamiliar
setting may appear to the jury as reckless conduct. Also, it may be difficult
for many juries to see how a "little" mistake could result in a $100,000,000
error. Therefore, the greater the magnitude of liability and the need for pro-
tection, the less likely it is that the indemnification agreement will be held
valid under Globus.
C. Obtaining a Release from a Client
Such a solution would have the attorney obtain an agreement from his
own client (either the issuer or underwriter, as the case may be) in which the
83 Id. at 411-12.
84 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83 Id. at 199.
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client would agree to waive or release any possible future causes of action
against the attorney for negligence arising from the legal services either per-
formed or failed to be performed in the preparation of the registration
statement.
The validity of such agreements between an attorney and his client has
never been litigated. Outside of the attorney-client relationship, courts gen-
erally have not invalidated releases from liability in the absence of legis-
lation or settled public policy." But since the relationship of attorney to
client rests upon the good faith and trust placed upon the attorney, and be-
cause this relationship gives the attorney opportunities for self-dealing, public
policy dictates that agreements between attorney and client in the course of
the relation are prima facie presumed to be fraudulent.87 Therefore, it is sub-
mitted that since it contravenes general public policy for an attorney to make
agreements with his client, other than possible fee or representational agree-
ments, a release obtained from a malpractice liability by an attorney from his
client should be held invalid.
A conscientious attorney may feel that agreements with clients to hold
harmless offend his sense of professional ethics. There is, however, no ex-
plicit prohibition in the Canons of Professional Ethics which would prohibit
this kind of agreement. An attorney whose sense of ethics is offended would
be wise to follow the dictates of his conscience, since a client's release from
liability will likely be found invalid anyway.
D. Insurance
Another possible solution would be to rely upon some form of malprac-
tice insurance. As with indemnification agreements and releases, the basic
question is whether the malpractice insurance policy is enforceable. The same
analysis used to determine the enforceability of an attorney's indemnification
agreement applies to the determination whether an attorney will be able to
collect on his malpractice insurance for his liability for misrepresentation in a
registration statement. 88 It has been suggested that, because of the prophy-
lactic policy of section I1, an attorney's indemnification agreement would be
unenforceable. It would follow that an attorney would be unable to enforce
his malpractice insurance policy.
There are, however, two considerations which relate to malpractice in-
surance but which do not relate to indemnification. These considerations mili-
tate in favor of enforceability of an attorney's malpractice insurance policy in
this situation: the likelihood that the policy will not cover total liability; and
the fact that the future premiums will rise if the insurance company must
pay." These two factors would tend to discourage breach of duty, in accord-
ance with the policy of section 11, and thus might make the insurance policy
enforceable. However, it is these very same factors—lack of total coverage"
86 See, e.g., Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Stevens, 123 F.2d 186, 192 (8th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 804 (1942).
87 Bell v. Ramirez, 299 S.W. 655, 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
88 Note, supra note 79, at 412 & n.49.
89 See id. at 412.
Do At least one law firm in Boston, Massachusetts has increased the coverage of its
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and higher future premiums--which illustrate the inadvisability of relying
upon a malpractice insurance policy for protection in this situation. Ideally,
the attorney wants total, not partial, protection and since his premium is
already high he does not wish to pay higher premiums in the future.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that spending more time in the preparation of registra-
tion statements and charging higher fees for added time and risk is the best
practical solution to the problem. Added time spent in preparation of a regis-
tration statement will reduce the likelihood of negligence by the attorney and
thereby reduce the likelihood of success by his client in an action of mal-
practice. At the same time it will serve as the best protection for the client by
reducing the likelihood of a misrepresentation in the registration statement.
Since the added time spent in preparation of a registration statement benefits
both attorney and client, a commensurately higher legal fee appears to be a
small price for the client to pay for his own best protection.
It is unfortunate that there is no .easier answer to the problem, or that
there is no sure means to avoid the liability which may result from the in-
evitable errors that sometimes. occur. But it appears unavoidably true that "a
scrupulous processing of the registration statement is the best sort of insurance
they [attorneys and clients] have against § 11 actions."91
RICHARD A. ABORN
Professional Liability Insurance to $15 million. See letter from David Z. Webster to
Richard Aborn, December 3, 1968, on file with the B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
51
 3 Loss at 1690.
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